

Repositioning “Men” in Gender Theory

David Bloodwood

© May 2003

www.bloodwood.org

Abstract

Most gender theory positions men as privileged by the gender order and so having little interest in change. This essay argues such a view reflects a problem with gender theory rather than a problem with men. Using Rose’s Foucauldian examination of the role of “psy” technologies in subjectivity and governmentality across the 20th century, I argue that claims for specific sorts of equality rely on specific sorts of subjectivity which have little to do with gender and more to do with enacted technologies of self. I explicate a practical loop between ethics, technologies of self, claims for equality, and current forms of subjectivity - all of which emerge out of ‘patriarchal’ society. This loop has not been observed or explored to date in theories about gender. I conclude that patriarchy must be seen as both creative and oppressive, and that men’s apparent lack of interest in change may have as much to do with lack of access to new skills of subjectivity as it has to do with investments in patriarchal privilege.

5,320 words

“Men” and Gender Theory

Many philosophers, sociologists and feminists recognise that conventionally Western habits of thinking use a pattern of dualism: defining an object in terms of a polar opposite, and then setting an hierarchical relation between the terms of the dualism (Thiele 1986; 37-38). An especially significant set of dualisms revolves around what feminists call gender: men/women, male/female, masculine/feminine. Dualistic thinking has a great deal of difficulty dealing with the poles of a dualism being connected in a continuum; we tend to think that an object is either one OR the other pole of the dualism - “I” can be EITHER a man OR a woman, but not both and not bits of each. “I” am EITHER male OR female but not both, and so on. While feminisms in the second half of last century worked hard to challenge many mechanisms and ideas that positions female, feminine and woman as the lesser or secondary term in the gender dualism, at the same time feminist analyses more or less centrally relied upon the coherence and usefulness of the term “women” in order to identify their subject and object of focus.

Increasingly this focus is challenged by postmodern feminists (e.g. Butler 1990, McNay 2000), but “women” nevertheless remains a meaningful term. I suggest that, even though the web of dualisms that revolve around and help to create the gender order in our society has clearly been shown to be merely a contingent and local construction, terms such as “women”, “men”, “male”, “female” and so on continue to have currency and usefulness because myriad conventions of practice, language, interaction, laws, regulations, buildings, spaces, and so on, refer to these terms as though they were real - and in consequence they ARE a real part of the concrete world.

This does not mean that women and men “actually” exist or, if they do, that they will or must or should continue to exist. Nor does it imply any essence of maleness or femaleness which needs to be discovered or recovered. It simply means that this is the world in which we live, and on some occasions, like using a public toilet, it becomes

relevant to which group we “belong”, while on other occasions, such as boarding a bus, it is not relevant. Unfortunately, to which group we belong is apparently relevant right down to extremely mundane and tiny details of what clothes we wear or don’t wear, and how we move our bodies in space and in relation with other bodies - so that gender, and especially WHICH gender, is one of Western society’s most ubiquitous defining operations.

On this basis, I argue that people with penises - i.e. the people who are conventionally described as “men” - have, to the extent that they are members of that group, a common interest in how the group is defined: its criteria for membership, and its criteria for acceptable or proper beliefs, practice and relation to self of its members. My focus, then, is on the existing forces that shape “men” - as individual persons, as a group and as a socially recognisable structure and label. My personal interest lies in seeking to change the practical content and metonymic links of “men” so that persons with penises (principally but not only myself) have a greater range of legitimated choices as to how we enact our lives.

So I come with what I may label “expansive” interests around masculinity and “men”, where I take “men” to exist not in actual persons but in the enactment of a social category. In this essay, I have a focus upon the persons conventionally considered to most closely fit the ideal category - i.e. straight white middle class men (which I refer to as “swhim”). It is these men and their close match with what Connell calls “hegemonic masculinity” which is of interest to me, because of the centrally significant role which that identity and that masculinity plays in social process and especially in theories of gender. Specifically, this group or position is seen as the archetypal person called “Man”, the paradigmatic subject, the individual par excellence. In many works of gender theory, the group swhim is theorised at the pinnacle of social advantage, the “predominant social group”, who receive the largest portion of the “patriarchal dividend” (Connell, 1995).

Critical theories of gender, such as feminism and queer theory, attempt to promote reasons and pathways for promulgating change in gender arrangements. Judging from the extent of social action connected with these critical theories, the theories seem attractive to many people: they “work” or “make sense” for such people in the sense that the theories seem to be adequate explanations of their experience or reality such that it appears their reality can be changed beneficially by subscribing to and acting on those ideas. Critical theorists of gender, both male and female, have long bemoaned the apparent resistance of “men” to actively engaging in processes of gender change (e.g. Segal 1990, Stoltenberg 1989, McMahan 1999, Connell 1995, Kimmel 1994, Jardine and Smith 1987). Such men’s apparent resistance to gender change has been theorised in critical gender theories as change not appearing to be in these men’s interest.

My proposal, however, is that critical theories which attempt to promote gender change but do not seem attractive to all parties involved are inadequate theories. Clearly, for the “men” identified in these theories, the theories do not make sense or work for them - even though the theories may work for other people. To construct a theory which conceptualises some groups as marginalised/oppressed and others as centralised/dominant, and to then propose change which seems in the interests only of the marginalised groups is hardly likely, I suggest, to appeal to those theorised in the centre. Nor is it likely to bring about fundamental change in the arrangements conceptualised. The marginal/central and oppressed/dominant dualisms which underpin that approach betray its inadequacies: such thinking is very characteristic of Westerners - and inevitably recycles the problem. Petersen (2003; 58) finds that “it is difficult to talk about masculinity without using binary conceptions of gender”, and I suggest it is hard to talk about gender without using binary conceptions of all sorts.

Pease (2002) argues that interests do not flow from social location, but are in fact constructed within discourse, so that men’s interests are not connected with

“maleness” or any other essentialist characteristic. Thus men’s interests can be reconstructed - and should be reconstructed around an ideal which does not yet exist.

In this essay I pick up the governmentality work of Nikolas Rose (1990, 1996) that proposes a model linking subjectivity with freedom and social order. I use this model to argue that new feminist claims for equality and autonomy are enabled by new forms of subjectivity which have been picked up more by women than men, and that this uneven uptake can be explained in terms of social process rather than essentialising discourses about gender.

I then propose, as an addition to Rose’s model, a view that links subjectivity via technologies of governing and rationalities of governing, with ethics. I suggest this addition to the governmentality model can be used to elucidate the often unarticulated ethics underlying governing projects, including projects of individual subjectivity. As illustration, I explore the weaving of the ethic of equality into subjectivities and into theories of gender in such a way that the group “men” appears to have nowhere to go.

Finally, I suggest as a fruitful avenue for further exploration, a genealogical examination of the Western ideal of equality, and the ways in which it both allows and limits specific sorts of subjectivity.

Subjectivity, Power and Freedom

Rose (1990) takes up Foucault’s work on governmentality and expands it to explore the material process by which subjectivity is created within the Western context of “freedom” as our own personal relation of self to self. One aspect of Rose’s work, of especial interest here, is that Rose is centrally concerned with the circular linkage between the sorts of selves that can be legitimately created and the forms of freedoms that can practically be enacted. His principle finding is that we are free to shape our lives in any way we choose, including our relations with ourselves, with others and with social institutions, as long as we do actually govern ourselves using practices which can be recognisable within the mode of Western governmentality as practices that govern.

In eliciting the circular relationship between the scale or breadth of freedom possible and the sorts of selves that enact that freedom, Rose explores some changes in subjectivity over the last century. The development of the “psy” sciences has enabled the governing of our “souls” at a new level of intricate detail. Gradually since Freud in the late 19th century, the experts of psy have come to play a very significant role, using familiar confessional techniques to investigate and measure people’s self-relation, but using new techniques of therapy based on the new psy knowledges. This expert role is two pronged: one in social process through the formal development of psy knowledges which shape and gradually expand the governable domain within individuals; and the other in individuals’ relation with themselves through the detailed and highly individualised and personal practices of therapy.

To this history of the psy sciences Rose adds a further point about the linkage between psy expertise and the possibilities available to state or government instrumentalities for the governing of individuals. Rose (1996) argues that a key ingredient in the spread of the new conservative liberal ethos in Western countries since the early 1980s is that the psy knowledges enable government of individuals at a yet further distance than ever before. This enables a new and characteristic flow of power in the so-called “neoliberal” national populations: the hugely expanded domain of freedom, enacted as a vastly increased range of choice available to individuals - as long as they actively involve themselves in their own government via psy knowledges. The reason this can work is that psy knowledge is intimately bound up with the aims of government - so that actively choosing individuals actively governing themselves are in fact actively creating, participating in and maintaining social order: the new or neoliberal social order.

Thus Rose offers an elicitation of the practice of subject-creation now, rather than a theory of subject-creation in general. He is self-consciously drawing up a genealogy of the present, describing what is being produced now, and from there he concludes how subjects are created now and why they are created in that way now, rather than trying to create a general theory of subjectivity.

One criticism of Rose is that the broad scope of his work tends to create an impression of overly-unified social objects and a picture of a singular sweep of historical change (O'Malley, Wear & Shearing 1997). McNay (2000) picks up Bourdieu's idea of "the field" to explain and theorise how and why social change is uneven temporally and spatially: Not all groups pick up new themes, nor are new themes picked up at the same time or same speed. I want to use Rose's general sketch of "new" subjectivity and Bourdieu's point about the unevenness of social change to suggest two aspects of the new subjectivity which specifically relate to gender.

New Subjectivity and Gender

Firstly is the significance or valence that gender holds in the new subjectivity. Neoliberal subjectivity appears to be not explicitly gendered in the way that modern or Enlightenment social objects are gendered. Gender obviously still operates, but has a new significance. Alongside the "symbolic codes of masculinity and femininity" is the active subject who shapes their engagement with self and with the world. And this active subject seamlessly incorporates some aspects from both codes. The entrepreneurial collection of attitudes that underpin neoliberal subjectivity - competition, self-interest, confident articulation, etc - clearly have a long historic association with masculinity. At the same time, the new technologies of subjectivity draw on the psy sciences' concern with the availability of a person's interior world to consciousness: knowing what one feels or desires, being able to precisely define one's needs or goals, the ability to "work on oneself" as part of a self-shaping project, are skills more commonly associated with femininity.

At the organisational or state level, I suggest, discourses of gender fulfil the function of operating as ready-made labelling devices and focusing technologies within the governmental practice of developing programmes for deployment to target groups. Both feminist and masculinity discourses are used indiscriminately in this way, picking up the already established meanings of terms such as "women", "fathers", "blokes" or "men" as definitions of target groups. Thus it is increasingly difficult to argue that "women" (or more recently "men") as a broad group are disadvantaged.

At the personal and interpersonal level however, gender is much more highly charged, but is in a sense much more "plastic", to use Giddens' term: meanings and actions are negotiable to the extent that the parties involved are willing and able to negotiate. This leads into my second point. Although Rose does not discuss feminism as a major force in his landscape, I want to point out that into and out of this historic process sketched by Rose came second wave feminism. I argue that the freedoms now enjoyed by women, from minor issues like the range of clothing to major life choices like children-or-career, centrally entail them willingly taking on the imperative to govern themselves. And I argue that that willingness has been shaped by women's engagement with the psy sciences since their appearance in the late 19th century. Therapeutic clients of psy have always been predominantly women and, although part of the discourse of psy has included the desire to control women by reinforcing gender stereotypes, at the same time it has meant that far more women than men have been exposed to the active and creative shaping forces entailed in psy's therapeutic technologies and practices.

In addition to the sheer force of superior numbers of women actively shaped by psy, is the way in which psy-as-therapy has become incorporated into meaning-systems and symbolic codes. Therapy has been for several decades a legitimate pursuit for women,

especially middle class women, while it has only recently become a legitimate pursuit for men, if at all. Ironically, women's engagement with therapy originated in a desire to manage women's "hysteria" and other supposed pathologies. But Bourdieu's point about specific fields having specific power relations holds true here: hysterical women became the target of governmental programmes using psy technologies and rationalities. An unexpected and unintended impact of this has been that women, more than men, have developed specific skills of subjectivity enabling them to conceptualise themselves in newly powerful ways. Rose's model shows that an integral effect of and basis for this new conceptualisation of self is a new conceptualisation of freedom which, I suggest, is manifesting in second-wave and subsequent feminist claims.

Thus the unevenness of uptake of one of the key sites at which the skills of new subjectivity are learned has a distinctly gendered aspect: men are way behind women. And this is by no means because "men's interests are patriarchal interests" or "men are scared of their feelings" but is an effect of social process and is politically implicated in broad social process in which both men and women participate. My point here is that there is a history to men's engagement with therapy which is shaped in a complex of forces which cannot be simply reduced to gender. This history can be excavated, and, in best governmental fashion, can be used to inform the next steps.

The issue of the gendered aspect of people's engagement with therapy has profound impacts at the personal and interpersonal level. I argue it is precisely because women far more than men have taken up the opportunity offered by psy technologies that women far more than men are proactive in re-shaping their private lives and personal relationships. And the gendered uptake of new subjectivity skills results in a general difference between men and women in these skills, and thus in major differences in perceptions of self and of freedom. In effect "ladies" have a qualitatively different subjectivity to "women", which is one common-sense basis for the difference in the two terms. On the other hand, the distance between "men" and "gents" is not nearly as great.

This view sets in a different context the various feminist claims about gender since the 1960s. Specifically, it is seeing gender change within a broader context in which both women and men participate, suggesting that gender change is not only initiated by a specific group with specific goals, but is also allowed by other more general shifts and developments which such groups pick up and build on. And it allows new views of the complexities of gendered interactions and of gender in social process. For example, the feminist notion of patriarchy-as-oppression is well known. What is not so well observed or theorised is that, in the psy sciences, men predominated as therapists and theorists to develop the technologies enabling the unintended consequence of women's new subjectivity. On this account, in psy, patriarchy needs to also be theorised as a powerful creative force as well.

Ethics and Governmental Rationalities

McNay (2000) would probably agree with this assessment. She argues that critical theories such as feminism predominantly theorise subjectivity as a "negative" force, in which subjects are theorised as being forcibly subjected or as unwillingly accepting subjection-as-ablation. The example I use above demonstrates that, in order to understand the complexities of gender in the psy sciences and subjectivity, theories need to include the creative and the oppressive forces involved. This is really no more than Foucault's view of power as a force that enables as much as it disables.

But power does not by any means enable or disable what is already there. Foucault argues that power is a shaping force, that is, it is essentially a creative force. Power enables a vision of how "we", the powerful, want things to be now, or how things should be in the future. But it does more than simply enable it - power enacts that

vision, or at least enacts steps towards that vision. In other words, power enacted always entails some sort of ethical scheme.

One of the strengths of governmentality theory is distinguishing between the “governmental technologies” which shape actual practices, and “governmental rationalities” or the stories attached to such technologies that address the symbolic/meaning aspect of social process. In his explication of neoliberal subjectivity and the circular link between personhood and social process, Rose (1996) points out that

New psy models of personhood, and the ethical schemes to which they are attached have no intrinsic political character. ... they can be used for emancipation or domination. (196)

Whether or not they have no intrinsic political character (and I have reservations about that argument), at the very least models of personhood always have an ethical scheme attached. My argument here is that models of personhood are always embedded in webs of power in order for them to be enactable, and power always entails an ethical scheme. The contents of the ethical scheme are endlessly malleable - Rose’s point - but ethics are always present.

My aim here is to highlight an addition to Rose’s linkage of subjectivity with technologies and rationalities of governing: that models of personhood are enactments of ethical schemes of “the good” or “how we should live”. It is in their rationalities that governmental efforts of all sorts hold or encapsulate their morality or ethical scheme - their vision of “the good”. No matter whether the effort in question is international relations, a university, a voluntary community group, or a private therapy session, the rationalities employed that enable the enacted practices to “make sense” to the actors involved are the hooks by which meaning becomes attached to that governing. One part of meaning-making entails constructing the governing project as a “good thing”: worthwhile in itself, worth engaging in despite the work involved, or attractive enough that people actually do become involved and comply. A very significant part of governmentality theory work is in fact elucidating the histories of how specific meanings come to make sense at specific times through their enactment in specific practices (Rose 1998; 89-91). The specific practices, once enacted, can then become the anchors for further inflections of meaning via assessment of the “results” of the practices: to what extent does practice X move us towards where we want to go or recreate what we want created now.

So I now have proposed a theoretical structure which links ethical schemes or conceptions of “the good”, via the Foucauldian concept of power-as-creativity in modern governance, through governmental rationalities into governmental technologies, and thus into the individual subjectivities of actual persons, who make meaning out of and into those ethical schemes or conceptions of “the good”, and enact that meaning through their actions. I want to now turn to explore the concept of equality, but not as an abstract principle. I want to explore it as an enacted ethical scheme. And, although my interest here is to follow the flow of an ethical principle through the structure, I want to stress that this structure is inherently circular and creative.

Equality

A common feminist claim is for “equality”. For example, Lois McNay (2000), whom I draw on above for reference to the work of Bourdieu, sees her theorising project as centrally involving equality:

... there is a need for a greater analytical distinction between changes in the form of gender inequality and progress; the decline of gender inequality along certain axes may trigger new forms of subordination in other areas. (158)

In this quote, she is imagining a link between equality and progress: equality = progress. She is also, at the symbolic/ethical level, implying that there is a link between inequality and subordination - although, as she makes clear, the two do not necessarily have a relationship in practice.

This, in some ordinary way, “makes sense”. Feminists who argue for equality argue that the restriction of the group “humans-who-are-equal” to only male humans undercuts the whole idea of equality - and on that basis many successful feminist claims have been made. But to the extent that the basis of these successful claims is a rationality built upon the history of meanings of the term in order to “make sense” to the actors involved, the assumption that equality refers only to humans is particularly cogent.

The great claim of the American constitution is that “all men are born equal”. Radical feminism and the other modern protest movements have expanded this to “all people are born equal”. My examination, above, of the “new” subjectivity and its relatively “ungendered” characteristics suggests that this expanded formulation has to a great extent been accepted, at least as an ethical claim.

A very important aspect of the reading of equality as “all people are born equal” is that it portrays equality as a natural characteristic of humans - people just have it anyway as soon as they are born. But this idea of equality is in fact an ethical project - the statement expresses an ideal, an aspiration and a (peculiarly Western) direction in which we should be going, rather than a natural fact. People have to actually devote a lot of energy into being “equal” and becoming legitimated subjects - as Rose points out, subjectivity is a project in which individuals actively engage. Equality is the ethical goal actively sought and, via its incorporation into governmental rationalities and technologies, modern Western subjectivity is the means by which it is concretely enacted by individuals.

There can of course be no argument with the principle of equality in the sense of those within its compass being assumed to have equal value. But the statements about equality which are enacted in Western subjectivities are specifically exclusive: it is humans who are created equal, so that by implication all other beings and things are not. The Western ethic becomes clear: humans alone have value - the rest of the world has no value. And while this ethic contains within it an exclusivist definition of who/what can be considered equal, the subjectivity which enacts it will likewise be exclusivist in some way.

In other words, while McNay holds the Western formulation of equality as a goal, her use of inequality as a category of measure along a men-women axis simply reinforces the whole exclusivist conceptual pattern of dualism, defining “women’s” inequality in terms of “men”. On this account, “men” gets theorised as a group that are already equal, and the “other” people as wanting to “catch up” or be included.

This account is, at one level accurate or “true”: the “others” who are excluded from equality obviously don’t have something which those in the included group do have. But my point about subjectivity and enacted ethical schemes here is that, although conceptually this formulation of equality seems logical, it leaves out of account the enactment of equality. I outlined Rose’s argument above about the link between subjectivity, practice and freedom, and I added to it a link between ethical schemes and individual subjectivities. I suggest that this conceptual model shows clearly that the achievement of the status of equality entails the enacting of a large number of very specific and detailed personal skills in the world, as well as enacting a very specific relation of self to self. It follows from this that different skills and self-relations - i.e. different subjectivities - enact different definitions of who or what is of equal value.

As I said above, there is no question about the validity of equality as a general principle of ascribing a like value to all those considered equal. However, when we come to discuss issues of equality and gender, i.e. issues of “men” and “women”, we are immediately engaging a chain of enactment of ethical schemes because we are talking about persons - who always have subjectivities. Thus the details of who or what is considered equal, and the detailed signs which indicate the membership (or not) of that group at some point always intersect with issues of people’s individual relations with self and the possession of enactable specific skills of perception.

This argument suggests that specific formulations of equality arise out of specific subjectivities. This is the point I suggested above in my history of women and the psy sciences: that new claims for equality were enabled by new skills of subjectivity, and enacted by new sorts of subjects. Certainly the new claims articulated by feminists are relatively complex in comparison to conventional claims: feminists seek not only to be valued equally with men, but in addition to be valued because they are different to men (c.f. Snitow 1990, Scott 1990). Such a claim entails a capacity to view and experience difference as a positive experience rather than a source of fear and reason for exclusion. This capacity in turn relies on an enhanced capacity for “autonomy” of the sort described by Keller (1985), Friedman (1993), Schnarch (1997), and others: a capacity to “hold” or maintain a solid sense-of-self while interacting with others who are “different”.

This sort of subjectivity is substantially different to the subjectivity which, for centuries, pursued equality as a principle of sameness (Jaggar, 1990). I personally love (and enact) this new subjectivity which is able to encounter and benefit from difference - but let’s not claim that such a subjectivity is anything inherently about gender: it is simply a set of skills enabling a specific sort of relation with self (and thereby with others), which can be learned by anyone. It is valid, I believe, as I have argued in this essay, to propose that different sorts of subjectivity skills have different histories, and that different groups of people in different places have varying relations with those skills. But this is an entirely different sort of claim to essentialist claims about equality, men and women.

Conclusion

In this essay I have made three principle points with respect to gender theory.

- Broad claims in feminist work about equality conceptualise men as being at one pole of a dualism, thereby recycling one of the fundamental structures of gender, leading to inadequate gender theory in which men apparently have no interest in gender change. This is a problem with theory rather than a problem with men.
- The lack of theorising of the link between subjectivity and ethical claims allows an obscuring of the history of the varying claims over time and their link with specific subjectivities, and an obscuring of the gendered history of engagements with sites of new subjectivity skills.
- The psy sciences created new subjects at the same time as they reinforced existing gender stereotypes, and this complex interweaving of creation and oppression is not adequately explored or theorised in a coherent way within gender theory.

This extremely brief essay suggests several avenues for further work in relation to men. The link between specific skills of subjectivity and specific enactments of equality needs greater exploration. The history of the discursive engagement between “men” and “therapy” - i.e. the power relations in that field - is worth eliciting and could, I suggest, provide a major source of empowerment for actual men in opening up new spaces for new engagements.

McNay is arguing for the development of a positive paradigm of subjectivity theory in addition to the negative paradigm. I suggest that “men”, being the ostensible and overt focus of positive social processes of subject creation, have a great deal to add to this process. In addition, I suggest that “men” can be used as a litmus test for new theories to the extent that, if such theories position “men” as having an interest in gender change alongside “women”, these theories are likely to be more adequate.

Aside from the role that “men” and actual men could play in this project, a more complete positive/negative theory of subjectivity also has the potential to pick up “men’s pain” and view it as inevitably entailed in producing the privileges enjoyed by “men” - the sort of approach suggested by Kaufman (1994). Thus a more complete theory of subjectivity could potentially enable a more complete and open discussion, at the broad social level, of the sorts of pains involved in various forms of power, without reducing the experiencing of these pains to discourses either of victimhood or of heroism. This society-wide discussion of pain and power has the greatest potential, I believe, to enable real choices to be made collectively about the costs of power in terms of pain, and more particularly the specific sorts of pains we are willing to experience in exchange for what specific forms of power. In this context, my own personal goal of a greater range of legitimated choices as to how men enact their lives becomes possible.

Finally, a brief comment about gender in the Foucauldian/Rosean model of subjectivity. There is the potential, I think, in the broad sweep of Rose’s portrayal of the recent developments in subjectivity to in some sense theorise gender out of existence by not noticing it. Connell (1987) argues that gender is a system for distributing power. I suggest that, alongside this view, gender also operates as a meaning-system enabling various specific ethical schemes to be enacted. Every human culture must incorporate the biological fact of sexual dimorphism and make some meaning of it, just as every human culture must make meaning of humanness and its relation with others. Sexual dimorphism clearly isn’t going away, so that Western cultures must continue to make meaning of it. What is open for contestation, however, is exactly what that meaning consists of - and what sorts of lives are enacted.

Bibliography

- Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Connell, R.W. *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics*. Cambridge: Polity, 1987
- Connell, R.W. *Masculinities*. St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1995.
- Friedman, Marilyn. ‘Gendered Morality’, in *What are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Morality*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. pp 117-141
- Heath, Stephen. “Male Feminism”, from *Men in Feminism* eds Jardine and Smith, New York: Routledge, 1987
- Jaggar, Alison. “Sexual Difference and Sexual Equality” in *Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference*, Deborah Rhode (ed). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990 (H298 Vol II p 38)
- Kaufman, Michael. ‘Men, Feminism and Men’s Contradictory Experiences of Power’, in Brod, Harry and Kaufman, Michael (eds). *Theorising Masculinities*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994. pp 142-163.
- Keller, Evelyn Fox. *Reflections of Gender and Science*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985
- Kimmel, Michael. ‘Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity’, in Brod, Harry and Kaufman, Michael (eds). *Theorising Masculinities*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp 119-141

- McMahon, Anthony. *Taking Care of Men: Sexual Politics in the Public Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- McNay, Lois. *Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist Social Theory*. London: Basil Blackwell, 2000.
- O'Malley, Pat; Wear, R. and Shearing, C. 'Governmentality, Criticism and Politics', *Economy and Society* Vol 26, No 4. 1997. pp 501-517
- Pease, Bob. '(Re)constructing Men's Interests', in *Men and Masculinities*, Vol 5 No 2, October 2002. pp 165-177
- Petersen, Alan. 'Research on Men and Masculinities: some Implications of Recent Theory for Future Work', in *Men and Masculinities*, Vol 6 No 1, July 2003. pp 54-69
- Petersen, Alan. *Unmasking the Masculine: 'Men' and 'Identity' in a Skeptical Age*. London: Sage, 1998.
- Rose, Nikolas. 'An Interview with Nikolas Rose', *Arena Journal*, No 11, 1998. pp 83-95.
- Rose, Nikolas. *Governing the Soul: the Shaping of the Private Self*. London: Routledge, 1990
- Rose, Nikolas. *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Schnarch, David. *Passionate Marriage: Keeping Love and Intimacy Alive in Committed Relationships*. Melbourne: Scribe, 1997.
- Scott, Joan W. 'Deconstructing equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism', in *Conflicts in Feminism*, Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller (eds). New York: Routledge, 1990. pp 134-148
- Segal, Lynne. *Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men*. London: Virago 1997 (2nd Ed'n, orig 1990)
- Snitow, Ann. 'A Gender Diary', in *Conflicts in Feminism*, Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller (eds). New York: Routledge, 1990. pp 9-43.
- Stoltenberg, John. *Refusing to be a Man: Essays on sex and Justice*. Portland, OR : Breitenbush Books, c1989
- Theile, Bev. 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought', in Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross (eds) *Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986. pp 30-43